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1  INTRODUCTION 
The trade-off between targeting and coverage has always been something of a quandary for 
progressive cash transfers, particularly those that are not entitlements. Undue inclusion errors 
mean that families or individuals whose need is not so great are being paid at the expense of 
either taxpayers or other budgetary priorities. Undue exclusion errors mean that those who are 
in need, sometimes in desperate need, are not being helped by the state.  
This trade-off is somewhat less extreme for entitlements. If the law says that families 
whose income is less than a quarter of a minimum wage are entitled to a given cash allowance, 
then all those whose income falls under that line should receive the allowance. There is still a 
trade-off because measurement error still occurs, but the discussion centres only on the 
inclusion criteria. Most conditional cash transfers (CCTs), however, are not entitlements.  
When cash transfers of any kind are not entitlements, the targeting-coverage trade-off 
becomes more dramatic. In addition to inclusion criteria, coverage targets must be set and 
met. These coverage targets are usually set ex-ante and estimated before administrative 
records have given a clear idea of what is happening at the micro household level. Since these 
cash transfer programmes have suffered (or benefitted) from very high political visibility, it 
becomes difficult to change coverage targets once these are announced.  
Our objective in this paper is to illustrate these quandaries using Latin America’s largest 
CCT scheme, Brazil’s Bolsa Família programme (PBF). To do this, we first describe briefly how 
the programme came to be and its targeting mechanisms. Section 3 discusses the size of the 
programme according to different criteria (this is important in deciding whether it is too small 
or just right). The following section evaluates how good Bolsa Família is at reaching the poor 
and only the poor. Section 5 considers the concept of income volatility and why the poor are 
especially hard-hit by uncertainty about tomorrow’s income. Section 6 examines cross-
sectional coverage. Section 7 discusses Bolsa Família’s marginal targeting and explains  
why this is the right concept to use in estimating how big it should be to cover all the poor.  
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2  THE BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROGRAMME AND ITS  
TARGETING MECHANISMS 
The PBF was created by the federal government in October 2003. Far from being a radical 
novelty on Brazil’s social policy scene, the PBF was more of an excellent managerial initiative 
whose goal was to unify initially four, and eventually five, pre-existing targeted cash transfer 
programmes. These were the Programa Bolsa Escola, Programa Bolsa Alimentação, Auxílio Gás 
and Programa Nacional de Acesso à Alimentação (also known as Cartão Alimentação). A fifth CCT 
programme, the Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (Child Labour Eradication 
Programme, PETI), was not fully incorporated until December 2005.  
Before the unification under the PBF, each of the above programmes had its  
own implementing agency, information system and financing source. There was little 
communication or cooperation, and sometimes considerable animosity, between the 
managers of the different programmes. This meant that it was possible for one family to 
receive all five benefits and another, with exactly the same socioeconomic profile, to be 
excluded from all five. The programmes had different transfer amounts, and thus the federal 
government could be paying different amounts to families in identical circumstances.  
The justification for these differences was that, though the programmes targeted the same 
population (the poor), they had differing objectives. This weak argument was used and abused 
by the opponents of unification, who feared that their own objectives (and, of course, their 
political clout) would be hampered by unification.  
The PBF unified the inclusion and exclusion criteria, the transfer amounts, the 
implementing agency and, perhaps most importantly, the information system. Today, families 
whose per capita income is less than to R$140 receive R$22 for each child aged 14 or younger, 
up to a maximum of three children per family, and another R$33 for each teenager aged 15 to 
16 (16 is the minimum age for paid labour in Brazil), up to a maximum of two per family. 
Additionally, families whose per capita income is below R$70 receive another R$68, 
independently of household composition.  
The implementing agency is the Secretaria Nacional de Renda para a Cidadania (National 
Citizenship Income Secretariat, Senarc) of the Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à 
Fome (Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger, MDS). The Caixa Econômica 
Federal (CEF), a federal bank, is in charge of making the payments. Perhaps the most important 
step in the unification process was a unified information system and registry, called the 
Cadastro Unico (CadÚnico). The CadÚnico was actually set up in 2001, two years before the 
PBF, but was largely theoretical before 2003 because of inter-agency strife. The creation of  
the PBF brought the CadÚnico into the limelight as the single information system on which 
basis decisions were made about who would and who would not receive PBF benefits.  
In conclusion, PBF today has a legal mandate and operational structure that allow better 
targeting and wider coverage than before. In 2003 the first coverage target was established:  
11 million families. 
Even following the 2003 unification, however, the minimum income system in Brazil is 
more than just the PBF. The Benefício de Prestação Continuada (Continuous Benefit, BPC), 
mandated by the Lei Orgânica de Assistência Social (Social Assistance Organic Law, Loas) is 
actually bigger in budgetary terms than the PBF. Although they have different eligibility 
criteria and information systems, are run by different agencies, and even use different Working Paper  3 
 
definitions of what a household is, they are both cash transfers targeted at the poor.  
The transfer amounts also differ widely. The BPC pays exactly one minimum wage, which  
is currently R$510; this is more than twice the R$200 maximum that any family can receive  
under the PBF. The argument for such a difference is that the PBF is an income 
complementation programme whereas the BPC is an income substitution programme for 
elderly or disabled individuals in poor families. Since the BPC is part of the minimum income 
system, it will also be analysed in this paper, but we will concentrate on how it compares and 
relates to the PBF.  
The targeting and coverage of the PBF, of course, is the subject of this study. We will 
concentrate on the years for which we have information on the programme from household 
surveys; those years are 2004 and 2006. In September of these two years, the National Sample 
Household Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios, PNAD) included a supplement 
on cash transfer programmes that facilitates the analysis in which we are interested. 
In 2004, the PBF was an expanding programme. Its coverage had not yet reached the 
initial 11 million family target, and every year more families were added to it. Administrative 
records show that this target was reached only in 2006. From 2006 to the beginning of 2009, 
the PBF remained at 11 million families, and new families were added only at the expense  
of others losing their benefits. Our hypothesis is that this expansion benefited both the 
programme’s coverage and its targeting. It is to be expected that expansion would lead to 
better coverage among the eligible and worse targeting. This is why we investigate whether 
the PBF succeeded in including only the poor (according to the programme’s definition) and 
whether it was successful in including all the poor.  
Why Coverage Targets?  
The use of targeting mechanisms in social policy is justified on efficiency grounds: more 
resources are concentrated on the most needy (Coady et al., 2004). Hence targeting can be 
seen as a mechanism to heighten the impact on the poor, given that resources are limited. 
Targeting can also be justified independently of resource constraints if equality is seen as an 
end in itself (Soares et al., 2007). Finding and favouring those most in need, however, is not a 
minor process, and it has side effects on those in charge of the targeting and on the eligible 
and non-eligible populations. Programme managers face the administrative costs of 
investigating families to determine their income and behaviours, and also significant political 
costs because the inevitable errors will provide ready ammunition to the managers’ political 
adversaries. For families, targeting may create some kind of stigma and the required 
behavioural changes may also entail costs (Coady et al., 2004).  
As far as Bolsa Família is concerned, the most significant cost is most certainly 
administrative. Maintaining a registry with detailed household and family information on 
almost 20,000 families in a country as vast and diverse as Brazil is not an easy administrative 
task. The use of pre-existing municipal administrative structures, however, makes the 
undertaking much easier and much cheaper. In 2007, the PBF’s administrative budget was 
R$232 million, which is about 2.6 per cent of the programme’s total budget. Since Brazil is a 
highly decentralised and federative country, beneficiary selection is a joint task of the federal 
and municipal governments. MDS provides municipal administrations with a standard registry 
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households’ demographic composition and income. If a family is eligible, in theory it should be 
given a Bolsa Família benefit; otherwise it simply remains registered in the CadÚnico, which is 
also used by other, smaller social programmes.  
If a family receives a PBF benefit after municipal social workers have ascertained its need, 
it receives this benefit for two years. After two years, the family is once again visited by social 
workers, who check if its socioeconomic conditions have changed or remained the same.  
If these conditions have changed for the better, the benefit is cancelled; otherwise the  
family remains part of the programme for another two years.  
Completing the information on the CadÚnico form is the responsibility of municipal 
employees, who then send the data either online or in hard copy to the Federal Bank  
(Caixa Economica Federal, CEF), which is in charge of payments. The CEF consolidates the  
data and turns it over to the ministry, which decides who is eligible. The list of beneficiaries  
is then turned over to the CEF, and the payments are made.  
There is, however, one stumbling block to the smooth working of this machine. There are 
both national and municipal targets (limits), based on ex-ante poverty estimates. Since these 
estimates almost never coincide with the numbers received from the municipal authorities, 
many municipalities cannot find enough poor people to fill their quota, and in even more 
municipalities there are not enough benefits to go around. Lindert et al. (2007) argue  
that the municipal quotas are important to keep mayors from registering their populations 
indiscriminately. Quotas, by imposing limits, also impose costs, thus forcing mayors to select 
only the eligible. This argument, of course, presupposes that the poor or those acting for them 
are able to muster the necessary social control mechanisms at the local level. It is a very 
questionable assumption and there is no empirical evidence that this in fact happens.  
The first municipal targets were based on the 2000 Demographic Census and the 2001 
PNAD survey. The poverty line, of course, is the PBF eligibility line (R$100, which was close to 
half the minimum wage in 2002) and family per capita income is calculated using the same 
methodology applied in the 2000 census. In 2006, the quotas were recalculated taking into 
account the improving income distribution as measured by the 2004 PNAD (Lindert et al., 
2007). Note, however, that the PNAD survey allows for estimates of some precision only at the 
state level; individual municipalities cannot even be identified in the PNAD microdata. 
Needless to say, imputing poverty estimates for over 5,000 municipalities three or four or  
more years after their families’ incomes were measured involves a lot of guesswork. 
The municipal quotas are subject to negotiation. Benefits can be transferred from 
municipalities that cannot meet their quotas to those that exceed them. This transfer is neither 
automatic nor limitless, but there is some room for negotiation. What has been an iron number 
is the 11 million target or quota for the whole country. From 2006 to 2009, despite strong 
evidence of incomplete coverage, the number of benefits was not allowed to increase.  
There Are Also No Quotas for Registration in the CadÚnico 
Who provides the information on which basis the benefit is granted varies by municipality.  
In some municipalities, the information is strictly self-declared. In others, social workers  
verify earnings directly. In still others, information on expenditures is used as verification.  
From the viewpoint of the federal government, however, all the information in the CadÚnico  
is considered self-declaratory. MDS performs some additional tests using pension and  
formal labour-market data. In other words, the PBF follows a verified, or at least partially 
verified, means test.  Working Paper  5 
 
Some authors, such as Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004) regard verified means testing 
as the gold standard in targeting methods. Still, the PBF is the only CCT in Latin America to 
provide benefits on the basis of self-declared information, spurring fears that its targeting 
might not be as good as those of other programmes that use indirect methods, such as 
composite indices, to choose beneficiaries. Despite their admiration for verified means testing, 
Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott state that in less developed countries, where informal income is 
more important, indirect methods may be better. Nevertheless, Soares et al. (2007) show that 
when PBF targeting is compared to that of other programmes, such as Chile Solidario or 
Progresa, it fares no worse. Soares et al. (2007), Hoffmann (2007), and Barros et al. (2007), 
among others, show that Bolsa Familia is by far the most progressive income source  
in Brazil and 80 per cent of transfers go to the 23 per cent poorest individuals.  
Soares, Ribas and Osório (2007) compare Bolsa Família results with those found by Coady, 
Grosh and Hoddinott (2004), and show that the PBF is among the 10 best targeted of the 122 
programmes analysed. Barros et al. (2008) show that 40 per cent of PBF targeting performance is 
explained by registration in the CadÚnico alone, and only another 4 per cent is explained by the 
targeting process that occurs after that step. In other words, most of the PBF’s performance is 
essentially self-selection by those who sign up for it. There are two possible explanations for this: 
municipal social workers are very effective at identifying and discouraging non-eligible families 
from signing up; or non-eligible families are simply not interested.  
3  HOW BIG IS BOLSA FAMÍLIA? 
If the PBF is judged according to the volume of resources at its disposal, then it is a relatively 
modest programme. In 2006, PBF transfers accounted for a mere 0.69 per cent of household 
income as measured by household surveys, and an even less impressive 0.35 per cent of GDP. 
The other big targeted transfer programme, the BPC, was also modest at 0.53 per cent of 
household income and 0.41 per cent of GDP. The fact that the BPC is larger than the PBF 
(according to official financial data) and smaller than it (according to household surveys)  
is a result of under-reporting in household surveys. The BPC has some characteristics of a 
pension and many individuals report BPC income as pension income in household surveys.  
In any case, when compared to the 7 per cent of GDP spent by social security or the | 
2.3 per cent accounted for by the pensions of federal employees, the 0.76 per cent transferred 
jointly by the PBF and BPC seems quite small. Table 1 shows that, as a proportion of household 
income, the BPC grew by 0.24 percentage points between 2004 and 2006; the PBF grew by 
0.20 points in the same period. In terms of share of GDP, growth was 0.12 for BPC and 0.05  
for PBF. In conclusion, although together they approach 1 per cent of GDP, the BPC and PBF 
are relatively lightweight budget items. 
A second criterion to judge the size of a programme is its coverage, or how many families 
and individuals are receiving benefits. Household survey and administrative records do not agree 
either for the PBF or BPC. In the case of the BPC the reason is quite clear: many beneficiaries 
declare it as a pension and not as welfare. The reason for the discrepancies in the PBF count is 
different. In September 2006, the expansion process was in its final stage; there were 1.5 million 
benefit cards in the mail; their owners had not yet received them and thus had not yet been paid. 
The discrepancy between the household survey and administrative records may have arisen 
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Other minor factors may also have contributed, such as benefits given to indigenous peoples, 
landless peasants, quilombolas, those freed from slave labour or other specific groups who, 
because of geographical concentration, are not adequately covered by sample surveys. 
Whatever the data source, if the criterion for size is the number of people or families 
covered, then PBF and BPC are quite large. Almost a quarter of the Brazilian population  
(47.4 million people) were in the 10.2 million families receiving a PBF benefit. The only social 
policies with wider coverage are the universal health system (SUS), which theoretically covers 
all Brazilians; public education, with 52.8 million students enrolled in all levels; and social 
security with its 21.2 million benefits. Note that these are universal policies that comprise  
the backbone of Brazilian social policy.  
TABLE 1 
Size of Bolsa Família and Benefício de Prestação Continuada 
Bolsa Família     
Criterion 2004  2006  Change 
Number of families (CadÚnico) (millions)  9.0  11.1  2.1 
Number of families (PNAD) (millions)  6.3  9.0  2.7 
Percentage of families in Brazil (PNAD)  12.5  16.8  4.3 p.p. 
Number of people (PNAD) (millions)   31.7  42.7  10.9 
Percentage of Brazilian population (PNAD)  17.9  23.4  5.4 p.p. 
Percentage of total family income (PNAD)  0.49  0.69  0.20 p.p. 
Percentage of GDP (SIAFI/SIDOR)  0.30  0.35  0.05 p.p. 
Benefício de Prestação Continuada 
Criterion 2004  2006  Change 
Number of families (CadÚnico) (millions)  2.0  2.4  0.5 
Number of families (PNAD) (millions)  0.7  1.2  0.5 
Percentage of families in Brazil (PNAD)  1.5  2.2  0.8 p.p. 
Number of people (PNAD) (millions)   3.1  4.7  1.6 
Percentage of Brazilian population (PNAD)  1.8  2.6  0.8 p.p. 
Percentage of total family income (PNAD)  0.28  0.53  0.24 p.p. 
Percentage of GDP (SIAFI/SIDOR)  0.30  0.41  0.12 p.p. 
Sources: CadÚnico, Social Security Ministry (Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social, MPAS), 2004 and 2006 
PNADs; Castro et al. (2008); and Diretoria de Estudos Sociais (Disoc) of IPEA. 
 
Despite these numbers, many eligible families are still not covered by the PBF. Before 
going into these numbers, we will judge Bolsa Família and the BPC by yet another yardstick: 
their impacts on the income distribution from 2004 to 2006.  
Estimates of the contribution of the BPC and PBF to the reduction of inequality in Brazil 
are nothing new. Soares et al. (2006), Soares et al. (2007), Hoffmann (2007) and Barros et al. 
(2007) have all produced estimates of the surprisingly high inequality impacts of the BPC  
and PBF. In this section we update these estimates. 
A good means of estimating how much an income source contributes to inequality and/or 
its reduction is to use concentration curves and the numbers that characterise them, 
concentration coefficients. How does one calculate a concentration curve? Working Paper  7 
 
a)  order the population by total income, including the transfers whose concentration 
coefficient we wish to know; 
b)  on the vertical axis, accumulate the population (ordered by income) up to  
a given percentile; 
c)  on the horizontal axis, accumulate the resources transferred to that same population; 
d)  the resulting figure is the concentration curve; 
e)  the concentration coefficient is twice area between the concentration curve and 
the line of perfect equality joining the points (0.0) and (1.1). The concentration 
coefficient of all income sources is also known as the Gini coefficient.  
 
Figure 1 shows that in both 2004 and 2006, the concentration curve of the BPC is always 
below that of the PBF. This means that the PBF transfer is mathematically and unequivocally 
more progressive than that of BPC. The reason is that the BPC transfer is much larger than the 
PBF one. It is so much bigger that it takes most of its beneficiaries and places them relatively high 
on the income distribution. This is quite apparent in Figure 1. There is a sharp increase in the BPC 
concentration curves at centile 59 in 2004 and centile 61 in 2006. These centiles correspond to 
the household incomes of R$260 and R$350 for 2004 and 2006, respectively, which are exactly 
the values of the minimum wage for these two years. The increase corresponds to handicapped 
and elderly people living alone, and whose only income source is the BPC itself.  
FIGURE 1  
Concentration Curves in 2004 and 2006 
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Calculating the contribution of transfers to the reduction of inequality is relatively simple. 
In mathematical terms: 
kk
k
Gc μ =∑  
where G is the Gini coefficient, ck represents the concentration coefficient of income source k 
and μk is the participation of income source k in total income.  
Table 2 shows that while labour earnings and pension income became less 
concentrated between 2004 and 2006, targeted cash transfers lost some of their 
progressivity. At the same time, these transfers increased their share of total income  
by 56 per cent, albeit from a very low baseline.  
TABLE 2 
Relative Size and Concentration Coefficients of Income Sources 
   2004 2006  ￿  (p.p.) 
Gini (per capita household income)  0.569  0.560  –0.010 
Income component     
Concentration  coefficients       
Labour income  0.567  0.563  –0.004 
Public  pensions  0.598 0.578 0.039 
Capital income and private transfers   0.649  0.654  –0.013 
Targeted social transfers  –0.373  –0.307  0.058 
     BPC  –0.111  –0.054  0.002 
     Bolsa Família  –0.524  –0.498  0.002 
Weight in total income     
Labour income  76.5%  76.0%  –0.0047 
Public pensions  18.0%  17.9%  –0.0012 
Capital income and private transfers   4.8%  4.9%  0.0015 
Targeted social transfers  0.78%  1.22%  0.0044 
     BPC  0.28%  0.53%  0.0024 
     Bolsa Família  0.49%  0.69%  0.0020 
Source: 2004 and 2006 PNADs. 
 
TABLE 3 
Decomposition of Inequality Change Between 2004 and 2006 
Income component  Concentration effect  Relative size effect  Total effect 
Labour income  –0.0003  –0.3069  –0.3072 
Public pensions  –0.0029  –0.3536  –0.3565 
Capital income and private transfers   0.0133  0.0241  0.0374 
Targeted social transfers  –0.4003  0.0659  –0.3343 
     BPC  –0.1560  0.0233  –0.1327 
     Bolsa Família  –0.2167  0.0150  –0.2017 
Total –0.3626  –0.5980  –0.9606 
Source: 2004 and 2006 PNADs. Working Paper  9 
 
The most important and surprising finding in Table 3 is that targeted social transfers 
accounted for third of the fall in inequality over the two years. This is surprising, because they 
account for less than 1 per cent of total income. The PBF alone was responsible for a fifth of the 
reduction. Labour and pension income contributed about a third each, but they account for 
three-quarters and 18 per cent, respectively, of total household income. This high efficiency 
against inequality of the BPC and PBF is due to the high progressivity of their benefits,  
which in turn is a function of their excellent targeting mechanisms. 
4  HOW GOOD IS BOLSA FAMÍLIA TARGETING?  
There are various standard tools for evaluating the targeting of income transfers.  
One, whose advantage is that it is sensitive to changes along the entire income distribution,  
is the incidence curve and the number that characterises it, the incidence coefficient. They are 
calculated in the same manner as their analogues, the concentration curve and coefficient, but 
with one important difference: individuals and their incomes are ordered according to their 
income net of the transfer whose incidence is being evaluated. The eligibility criterion for 
targeted social transfers is household income without the transfer itself. If it were not,  
there would be a contradiction between the criterion and the benefit.  
To calculate incomes net of targeted social transfers using the PNAD surveys we used the 
identification technique pioneered in Soares et al. (2006). It consists of using the information 
from the supplemental questionnaire on income transfers to extricate transfer income from 
the “other income” category in which it is buried.  
Incidence and concentration analysis are complementary. While the incidence curve 
shows the distributive impact of the first real transferred, the concentration curve shows the 
distributive impact of the last real transferred. When the question being answered is on the 
performance of an executing agency in reaching those in direst need, the correct approach is 
the incidence curve. When the question is on which programme should have its budget 
increased, the correct approach is the concentration curve.  
Figure 2 shows that there was a small deterioration in the targeting of both the BPC and 
PBF from 2004 to 2006. If decreasing returns apply to social-transfer targeting, then this is no 
surprise, since both their budgets and coverage became much larger over the two-year period. 
This means that the modest fall in the incidence coefficient is not a negative result in itself.  
If the PBF incidence coefficient (-0.568) in 2006 is compared to its analogues in Mexico 
(Oportunidades: -0.56) or Chile (Chile Solidario: -0.57), it does not fare badly.  
Another way of evaluating the targeting performance is the hit/miss ratio, which is the 
proportion of families or individuals receiving a transfer who are or are not eligible for it.  
Table 4 shows that in 2004 and 2006, respectively, 42.5 per cent and 49.2 per cent of families 
receiving Bolsa Família benefits had incomes above the eligibility cutoff at the time. In 2004, 
the cutoff was either R$50 for families without children or R$100 for families with children, but 
in 2006 the cutoff lines were R$60 and R$120. This means that almost half of PBF families did 
not meet the programme criteria.  
Half? This is quite a high number whose inconsistency with the excellent incidence 
coefficients needs explanation. Actually, the whole number needs explanation. A hit/miss ratio 
of half appears quite bad for any programme, not only one whose claims to excellent targeting 
have just been made.  10  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
The two most common explanations for this elevated targeting error are fraud or mistakes 
committed by municipal social workers. Fraud undoubtedly exists. Elected politicians, their 
families and friends have been found on Bolsa Família payrolls. Nevertheless, despite 
exhaustive investigation by both the National Audit Office and the media, the cases of fraud 
number in the few hundreds, which is completely insignificant when compared to 11 million 
benefits. Even if for every case of fraud discovered another ten go unnoticed, it is still not a 
relevant explanation for targeting errors in Bolsa Família.  
Honest and semi-honest mistakes are probably more relevant. First of all, there are 
completely unbiased and honest mistakes: reading a 7 as a 1 or a 9 as a 0, transposing the 
wrong column from the paper to the computer. The result is to add a random error that may 
explain some of the targeting error. 
There are also semi-honest mistakes. Potential beneficiaries have a very clear incentive to 
revise their incomes downwards on the CadÚnico form, but there is no such incentive for the 
anonymous information gathered by household surveys. Furthermore, social workers may 
identify a family as poor even if it formally does not meet the criteria, and they may fudge 
information one way or the other. For example, an agricultural family may be in the middle of 
harvest time when interviewed, and thus their income exceeds the PBF limit, but the social 
worker knows that in another three months they will be penniless. The social worker will then 
revise their income downwards so as to make sure they have some income in the coming 
tough months, thereby improving the real targeting of the PBF.  
FIGURE 2 
BPS and PBF Incidence Curves in 2004 and 2006 
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TABLE 4 
Bolsa Família Targeting 
  People Families 
2004 Non-eligible Eligible  Total  Non-eligible Eligible  Total 
Among  all         
PBF  non-beneficiary  70.1 12.0 82.1  77.9  9.6  87.5 
PBF beneficiary  7.0  11.0  17.9  5.3  7.2  12.5 
Total 77.0  23.0  100.0  83.2  16.8  100.0 
Among only beneficiaries  38.8  61.2  100.0  42.5  57.5  100.0 
  People Families 
2006 Non-eligible Eligible  Total  Non-eligible Eligible  Total 
Among  all         
PBF  non-beneficiary  68.6 8.0 76.6  76.6 6.6 83.2 
PBF  beneficiary  10.5 12.8 23.4  8.3  8.5  16.8 
Total 79.2  20.8  100.0  84.9  15.1  100.0 
Among only beneficiaries  45.1  54.9  100.0  49.2  50.8  100.0 
Source: 2004 and 2006 PNADs. 
 
As opposed to explicit fraud, it is very hard to quantify the prevalence of honest and  
semi-honest recording mistakes. Only a sample survey specially designed with re-interview 
procedures would allow for that. 
Finally, there is a third reason, one that is hard to separate from recording error:  
income volatility. By income volatility we mean uncertainty with relation to income. The PNAD 
enquires about income for a given month (September) of a given year and is not necessarily a 
good reflection of the socioeconomic situation of that family over a longer period. It may well 
be that many families, while observed as non-poor by the PNAD, were in reality highly 
vulnerable to poverty and thus eligible for PBF benefits.  
5  INCOME VOLATILITY AND TARGETING 
The Brazilian literature does not include many estimates of income volatility, but there are a 
few. Barros, Mendonça and Neri (1995) estimate that between 1982 and 1992, 15 per cent of 
the population crossed the poverty line in one direction or another. Their work suffers from 
some limitations: it is only valid for six metropolitan regions and ignores non-labour income. 
They use the Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, PME), which contains 
a panel allowing direct measurement of income volatility, but only covers the six largest 
metropolitan regions and only contains information about labour incomes. They deserve 
credit, however, for pointing out that poor people not only have limited access to income  
but that the little access they do have is highly uncertain.  
Ribas and Machado (2007) use pseudo-cohorts from the PNAD survey to estimate the 
percentage of the poor that often cross the poverty line as a result of idiosyncratic income 
changes. They conclude that between 1993 and 2003, about 27 per cent of the urban poor 
were temporarily poor. Ribas (2007) goes further, showing that the share of this transitory 
poverty in total poverty has been increasing over time. Finally, Ribas and Machado (2008) 
estimate poverty entry and exit rates in the same metropolitan regions as Barros, Mendonça 12  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
and Neri (1995). They also use the PME database but they innovate by imputing non-labour 
income as well. They find extremely high income volatility among the poor. In 2005, 31 per 
cent of the poor were no longer poor a month later, and 50 per cent had left poverty a year 
later. Some 12 per cent of the population crossed the poverty line in one direction or another 
from one month to the next. Over the period of one year, 15 per cent did so.  
If the poverty rate is defined as people who were poor in one of two consecutive months, 
the rate is six percentage points or a third higher than the poverty rate defined as individuals 
who are poor in any given month. The same comparison, defining poverty as those who are 
poor in one of two months one year apart, yields a poverty rate that is 40 per cent greater than 
the single-month poverty rate. 
Finally, the poverty return rate is also high. In 2005, 46 per cent of those who left poverty 
in a given month were back in poverty in the next one. Another 14 per cent returned to 
poverty two months after leaving it. Half of those who entered poverty were out of it the 
following month. The very clear conclusion is that poverty is neither static nor limited to a 
single episode. People at risk of becoming poor are constantly crossing the poverty  
line in both directions.  
Ribas (2007), however, does not use Bolsa Familia poverty lines but rather his own,  
relative lines. But it is not hard to replicate his methodology using the PBF cutoff lines.  
The methodology is not difficult and involves imputing incomes into the PME survey using  
the PNAD survey to find the coefficients.  
1.  We look for all variables that are common to the PME and PNAD. It is important 
that they not only have the same name but be asked in the same way, since we 
know that how you ask a question will influence the answers you get. There are 
quite a few, since the household composition, education and labour market 
participation questionnaires are quite similar in the two surveys. 
 
2.  Using, in the national-coverage PNAD survey, only the six metropolitan areas also 
covered in the PME, four equations are estimated: 
a.  a probit to find the covariates of the probability of receiving pensions;  
b.  least squares to find the value of pensions, for those who receive them;  
c.  a probit to find the probability of receiving other income; 
d.  least squares to find the value of this other income, for those who receive it. 
 
3.  Using the coefficients estimated above, the four variables are imputed in the PME. 
 
4.  Every imputation requires a residual. For lack of a better option, a random residual 
was used for all individuals. 
 
The resulting non-labour incomes are pooled to produce per capita household income, 
now complete with pensions and other income. Working Paper  13 
 
The random residual is kept constant for each individual throughout the four PME 
interviews. This means that imputed income will change only if an observed variable  
changes its value.  
Figure 3 shows the coefficient of variation (average/standard deviation) of each 
individual's per capita income. Both the average and the standard deviation are defined over 
the four interviews in the PME panel. If all members of the household keep their income during 
these four months, then the coefficient of variation is zero.  
Figure 3 shows clearly that the coefficient of variation for household income falls as 
income increases. In other words, the poor suffer much more income volatility than the rich. 
The explanatory power is not high, showing that various other factors are relevant predictors 
of volatility.  
More importantly, the procedure above allows us to define households as eligible or not 
eligible for Bolsa Familia, albeit with one important limitation. The criteria for eligibility involve 
income net of PBF income, but our imputation method does not allow the identification of PBF 
income. This is, however, a small limitation since the object of the exercise is not to estimate 
the number of eligible individuals but rather the volatility of their incomes.  
Once individual incomes are determined, we defined as poor the individuals who live in 
households whose per capita incomes fall below R$100 up to 2005 and R$120 from 2006 
onwards. These are of course, the income criteria for PBF benefits for families with children.  
Beginning in September of each year after the creation of the PBF (2004 to 2007), we 
followed three PME rotational groups, entering in August, September and October, for the four 
months that make up the panel.  
FIGURE 3 
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Figure 4 shows the rotation scheme for 2007. Group K7, for example, entered in August 
and was interviewed for the second time in September, but we consider this second interview 
as an October interview. This is because it is part of the three rotational groups whose entry is 
centred in September (the month of the PNAD interview). In Figure 4, October is shown by a 
black border and December by a double red border. In other words, for the four months 
beginning in September of each year, we followed a moving average of three rotational 
groups. We used three groups to increase the sample.  
FIGURE 4 
Rotational Scheme 
Month  Rotational group 
August  K7    
September  K7  K8  
October  K7  K8  L1 
November  K7  K8  L1 
December   K8  L1 
January        L1 
 
Do not worry if the above discussion seems complicated. It is not necessary to understand 
the details of how each cohort was assembled in order to understand the results below.  
For each month, we defined two poverty measures: transversal and longitudinal. 
Transversal poverty is the poverty measure we are used to: the percentage of people whose 
per capita household income fell beneath the PBF poverty (eligibility) line in a given month. 
Longitudinal poverty is the proportion of people whose per capita household incomes fell 
below the same line during any of the n months following September, when the panel we 
assembled begins. Thus, for September, the two measures coincide, but for December, the 
longitudinal measure is made up of individuals who were poor in any one of the four months 
between September and December.  
The results are shown in Figure 5. For all years shown, the longitudinal poverty rate in 
December is substantially higher than the transversal rate. For example, in December 2004  
the transversal rate is 15.9 per cent but the longitudinal rate is 24.7 per cent, about two-thirds 
higher. By definition, longitudinal poverty is higher than transversal poverty. The surprise is 
that it is so much higher.  
The second result is that the month-to-month increase in longitudinal poverty compared 
to transversal poverty is declining. In 2007, for example, there is an increase of 3.6 points from 
September to October, 1.8 points from October to November, and 1.2 points from November 
to December. These decreasing marginal increments are to be expected. As time passes, 
households at risk of falling into poverty will have already spent at least one month in poverty.  
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FIGURE 5 
Longitudinal and Transversal Poverty 
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Can these estimates be generalised to the country as a whole? Probably not. Alas, there is 
no longitudinal survey in Brazil for non-metropolitan areas, but we believe that volatility will 
probably be higher in rural areas and lower in medium-sized cities. What is undoubtedly  
true is that the poor face much uncertainty about tomorrow’s income.  
Are these estimates biased? Two effects lead to a negative bias. The first is that only 
families whose demographic composition remained intact throughout the four months are 
used. Since demographic changes in a household are an important source of income volatility, 
these almost certainly make up a less volatile sub-sample.  
The second effect is that the same random residuals drawn for the first month are  
kept throughout the remaining three in imputing non-labour income. This is the same  
as supposing that nothing that is non-observable changes during the four-month period.  
While it is probably a better procedure than redrawing new residuals each month, it makes 
for another downward bias.  
Notwithstanding these downward bias sources, there is an important source of upward 
bias: measurement error. If individuals do not know exactly what their income is (which is likely 
when dealing with the urban self-employed), there may be considerable measurement error of 
labour incomes. A street vendor not only takes home different incomes each month, but also 
probably knows with precision yesterday’s take but not last month’s. This increases the 
volatility of observed incomes but not that of real incomes. 
Thus there are two sources of negative bias and one of positive bias. What is the net bias? 
It is impossible to know with certainty, but it is likely to be positive. We have no solid empirical 
evidence of this, but we believe that the income volatility of the poor is slightly less than our 
estimates suggest, but still quite significant.  
What is the meaning of this for Bolsa Família? As we explained above, the PBF coverage 
targets were calculated using a survey in cross-section, the PNAD. But PBF benefit rules are not 
cross-sectional. Eligible families receive their benefits when eligible and keep them for two 
years, whereupon the socioeconomic condition of the family is once again evaluated.  
This means that the PBF poverty definition is a two-year longitudinal definition.  
Longitudinal definition and cross-section targets: the two will never match. The number  
of people in need will always be greater than the targets. This is, in fact, what happens.  
6  CROSS-SECTIONAL COVERAGE  
We have shown thus far that: (i) PBF benefits are highly progressive; (ii) this progressivity leads 
to strong inequality-reducing effects; and (iii) incoherent definitions of poverty lead to the 
impression that there are targeting problems. But do these problems really exist? We can go 
beyond hit/miss ratios and look at where on the income distribution the PBF beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries are located.  
Table 4 shows that 57 per cent of families that should be receiving a PBF benefit, 
according to the PNAD, were not on the payroll in 2004. More than half of the families whose 
per capita incomes were less than R$50 for the childless or less than R$100 for families with 
children were not covered by the programme. These numbers are not particularly serious, Working Paper  17 
 
because in 2004 the PBF was still a programme in expansion. However, with the expansion 
essentially over by September 2006, the programme was still not covering 44 per cent of 
eligible families.  
Figure 6 shows PBF coverage by income centile in 2004 and 2006. The solid blue line 
represents the percentage of individuals in each centile that are eligible for PBF transfers, 
according to PNAD data. They are all those with per capita incomes below R$60 (R$50 in 2004) 
and all those with per capita incomes below R$120 (R$100 in 2004) with children under 15. It is 
noteworthy that almost 90 per cent of the poorest households have children under 15.  
The dotted red line represents the actual PBF coverage by income centile. Due to sampling 
noise, the PBF coverage is calculated using a seven-centile moving average. The gap between 
the two lines is a centile-by-centile measure of under-coverage according to the legal  
PBF definition.  
FIGURE 6 
PBF Cross-Sectional (Transversal) Coverage by Income Centile 
Panel 1: 2004                Panel 2: 2006 
 
Source: 2004 and 2006 PNADs. 
 
The blue numbers in Panel 1 show the percentage of the population that are targeting 
hits: either those that should not be receiving PBF benefits and are not in fact receiving them; 
or those that should be beneficiaries and in fact are. The red numbers show the misses: those 
that should receive but do not; and those that should not receive but do. These are cross-
sectional definitions that do not take into account income volatility.  
If we correct for the 1.5 million PBF cards in the mail in September 2006, it is possible to 
draw another beneficiary line. We cannot know in a sample survey whose cards were still in the 
mail, but we can suppose that the new cards conformed to the same income distribution as 
the previous benefits. If we distribute the 1.5 million cards according to the observed benefit 
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analogous to those for 2004, but are calculated using this new benefit line.  
Exclusion error, for example, falls from 12 per cent of the Brazilian population in 2004 to  
6 per cent in 2006. Under-coverage in the poorest decile falls from 3.5 million to 2 million 
people, and in the second decile it falls from 9.6 to 4 million people. 
Finally, we can count how many families are between the different lines of Panel 2  
of Figure 6. Between the blue and red lines we have about 9.7 million people in 2 million 
households. This is an estimate of PBF under-coverage, but we know that, because of income 
volatility, it is not possible to achieve universal coverage of this population without (cross-
sectional) leaks. Only a national longitudinal survey will allow us to measure the true leakage.  
Before estimating how many people need to be included in the PBF to achieve universal 
coverage among the target population, we must look at the programme’s marginal targeting. 
This can be done by looking at its expansion between 2004 and 2006.  
7  BOLSA FAMÍLIA’S MARGINAL TARGETING 
If we suppose that PBF’s average and marginal targeting are the same, then we can conclude 
from the numbers in Figure 6 that 16 million beneficiaries would be enough to cover all poor 
families. The problem is that it is not at all clear that average and marginal targeting are the 
same. In general they will not be the same, since it is quite easy to find the first poor person  
in a country but quite difficult to find the last one. The bigger the dart, the harder it is to hit the 
target. This means that the important number is not the average distribution of benefits or the 
average hit/miss ratio of the 11 million beneficiary families, but rather the marginal distribution 
of benefits or the marginal hit/miss ratio. The price to be paid in terms of unwarranted 
inclusion for zero unwarranted exclusion must be calculated in marginal terms.  
TABLE 5 
PBF Marginal Targeting Estimate  
Elasticity 1.2003 
Standard error 0.1937 
Prob.  = 0 0.000 




Source: 2004 and 2006 PNADs. 
 
Estimates of this marginal targeting can be obtained using the programme’s expansion 
from 2004 to 2006. These are years in which there are CCT supplements in the PNAD questionnaire, 
and there was a considerable expansion in coverage between them. One method of obtaining a 
rough estimate is to use aggregated data by state and metropolitan area. Brazil has 26 states, 
nine major metropolitan areas and the Federal District, amounting to 36 distinct geographical 
areas all of which allow significant estimates of coverage in the PNAD sample. We have, for each 
of these areas, two observations: 2004 and 2006. This means that we can use differences-in-
differences with a log-linear regression adjustment on observed variables. The dependent 
variable is the variation in the number of (cross-sectional) non-eligible households receiving PBF 
benefits. We also used R$60 and R$120 poverty lines to eliminate variation due to changes in Working Paper  19 
 
eligibility criteria. The explanatory variable is the change in PBF coverage, using initial coverage 
as a control variable. The results are presented in Table 5. 
FIGURE 7 
PBF Marginal Targeting Estimate  
 
Source: 2004 and 2006 PNADs. 
 
The elasticity is basically 1 (1.2 with standard error of 0.2), which means that for every 
household included another, apparently non-eligible household, must also be included. This 
also means that average and marginal coverage are the same. Finally, it also means that the 
PBF must pay about 19 million benefits to achieve universal coverage among the poor.  
The horizontal axis in Figure 7 shows the change in PBF coverage from 2004 to 2006, the 
vertical axis shows the price paid: the change in non-eligible beneficiaries. States and 
metropolitan areas that fall below the regression line are more efficient than average, since 
they managed to increase eligible coverage more than non-eligible coverage. Those above the 
line are the states and metropolitan areas where coverage among the non-eligible increased 
more than among the eligible. The slope of the regression line (close to 1) is the average 
elasticity for the country as a whole.  
Using the above results to estimate the coverage necessary to leave no poor family 
behind, the number is 19 million. This obviously requires a radical review of both the national 
and municipal targets for the PBF. Perhaps a specific investigation of those states and 
metropolitan areas that were exceptionally efficient in increasing their coverage may yield 
some lessons for the others and somewhat improve the targeting, but it is unlikely that large 
gains will be made. This is because most of the coverage price to be paid is just a function of 
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8  CONCLUSION  
The Bolsa Família programme is by far the most important piece of the Zero Hunger initiative, 
whose goal is that no Brazilian will pass the day not knowing from where his or her next meal 
will come. This means that a reliable income source must exist for the poorest Brazilians so 
they are able to buy food for themselves and their children. But estimating at 11 million the 
number of poor/eligible families/households ignores the fact that the population that is 
vulnerable to poverty because of uncertainty about future incomes is much larger than the 
poor, as defined by a cross-sectional definition of poverty.  
The fact that PBF designers and managers (and just about everyone else, to be fair) 
ignored this elementary issue has led to a queue of 2 million families who were eligible for 
benefits but were not receiving them. This queue lasted from 2006 to 2009, when the financial 
crisis provided a political excuse to increase the PBF target above the initial 11 million. How 
many children went hungry because of this error in design is anyone’s guess. We will never 
know how many children had their futures compromised or even died. The political and moral 
imperatives that led to Zero Hunger are at odds with the implementation of Bolsa Família 
coverage targets. These imperatives are clear: it is perfectly acceptable to allow a family whose 
income, temporarily, is slightly above R$120 to receive its meagre benefits, but it is completely 
unacceptable to allow even one life to be extinguished or one future ruined because someone 
made a conceptual error in defining programme quotas. A family whose income is R$150 may 
be highly vulnerable to poverty. 
Today the 11 million limit has thankfully been exploded and no other self-imposed folly 
has taken its place. The ministry increased PBF quotas in 2009 and 2010, and no one appears 
even to have noticed. Today the quota is at 13 million and, because of improvements in the 
labour market, this is probably close to what is needed for full coverage.  
An important result is that PBF marginal and average targeting efficiency are the same. 
This is consistent with an interpretation that the targeting problems stem from the wrong 
measurement of poverty and not from targeting problems per se. After all, if the PBF has the 
lowest coefficient of concentration on record, its targeting cannot be so bad.  
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